Many successful open source projects have been developed by programmers who were employed by firms but worked on the open source projects on the side due to economic incentives like career improvement benefits. Such side work may be a good thing for the employing firms too if they get some strategic value from the open source software and/ or if the productivity of the programmers on these projects improves due to learning by doing effects. However, the programmers may work more or less on these projects than what is best for the firms. To manage the programmers' effort the firms set appropriate employment policies and incentives. These policies and career concerns then together govern the programmers' effort allocation between the open source and proprietary projects. We examine this relationship using a variant of the principal agent model. We derive and characterize the optimal employment contracts and show that firms either offer a bonus for only one of the two projects or do not offer any bonuses. But if attractive alternate employment opportunities are available, they change their strategy and may offer bonuses for both projects simultaneously.
Introduction
Brian Behlendorf was employed as a web administrator at Wired when he started to work on the open source project that became Apache, the web server that today has almost 70% market share (news.netcraft.com). Similarly, Larry Wall was employed at Unisys as a programmer when he invented the Perl language and wrote an open source interpreter for it. Today many consider Perl to be the "glue that holds the web together." Many open source programmers are similar to Behlendorf and Wall in that they have a "day" job while they "moonlight" on open source projects. 55% of programmers in a survey by Lakhani and Wolf (2005) This improves the programmers' performance on the firm's projects and thus is beneficial to the firms. Writing on the value of human capital, Arrow (1962) , Becker (1962) and Blaug (1976) explain that learning is very valuable and that it takes place in one of two ways: Learning by doing and learning by investing in training. This literature also recognizes that the two forms of learning are not substitutes, in that they may provide mutually exclusive benefits (Killingsworth (1982) ). The learning by doing benefit of open source software has been examined through survey based papers by Lakhani and Wolf (2005) , Hars and Ou (2002) and Hertel, Niedner, and Herrmann (2003) . All these papers find overwhelming evidence that skill building is an important reason due to which programmers choose to contribute to open source projects. von Krogh, Spaeth, and Lakhani (2003) suggest reasons for why learning by doing happens due to open source participation. They observe that peers in the project community, software users, and interested outsiders who are involved in open source projects help evaluate code submissions, find faults in programming and often suggest changes to improve the performance of the code. This interactive process improves both the quality of code submission and overall programming skills of the participants. Industry insiders like Moody (2002) , Raymond (2001) and Wayner (2000) also confirm that an active peer review process forms the foundation on which the learning by doing from open source projects is based. Lakhani and von Hippel (2003) report on the motives of this peer review process. Besides helping the community and altruism, they find that programmers help each other in order to find out about the problems others have faced. This learning helps them to manage and update their own web sites and software code. A report compiled for the European Communities, United Nations University UNU- MERIT (2006) , delved deeper into the issues of skill building through open source projects. Thus learning from open source projects directly increases the value of the programmer's work for the commercial firms. This is not surprising in the light of Schilling, Vidal, Polyhart, and Marangoni (2003) who use an experimental study and Boh, Slaughter, and Espinosa (2007) who use empirical data to show that diverse experience in related systems improves programmers' learning and thereby facilitates increased productivity. The value of learning from open source for the firms can also be explained through the value of external knowledge (Menon and Pfeffer (2003) ). That is why firms resort to activities such as hiring outside consultants and acquisitions. We therefore infer that learning by doing open source software projects may offer human capital development beyond what is provided through classroom training activities and learning by doing from the firm's projects themselves.
It reports that programmers indicated the programming skills learnt open source participation can
Besides learning from open source projects, programmers learn from working on firm's projects as well. Reagans, Argote, and Brooks (2005) find that individuals working inside an organization become more productive as they learn from cumulative experience of others and also learn to coordinate better as they discover who knows what and trust each other more. Thus programmers learn due to their work in an organization and this is useful in improving programmer productivity.
Further, Boh, Slaughter, and Espinosa (2007) show that programmer learning improves the most from experience in a specific system. Hence working in proprietary projects significantly improves skills. Finally, since programming skills can be construed as industry specific human capital (Neal 1 http://oreilly.com/news/osconint 0601.html Dewan, Freimer, and Mehra: Firms Multi-tasking on open and proprietary projects by programmers should not pose any problems since there is ample evidence that firms have increasingly adopted organizational structures that encourage multi-tasking (Lindbeck and Snower (2000) , Pautrel (2004) , Cartensen (2002), Lindbeck and Snower (1996) , Breshnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002) , Caroli and Reenen (2001) ). This implies that the firms are amenable to sustaining open and closed source activity by the programmers. Learning by working on open source projects is costless for the firm beyond the opportunity cost of its programmers' time spent on these projects.
Besides learning by doing, career incentives also motivate programmers to contribute to open source projects. Proof of high talent leads to high wages in the labor market (Weiss (1995) ). Extant literature on career concerns deals with issues of optimal contract design to induce workers to make better corporate investment choices as as in Milbourn, Shockley, and Thakor (2001) , or better effort choices in presence of moral hazard as in Holmstrom (1999) , Gibbons and Murphy (1992) and Lal and Srinivasan (1993) . Hann, Roberts, Slaughter, and Fielding (2006) empirically confirm that enhancement in career is one reason why programmers contribute to open source projects. Their study was based on the analysis of the Apache web server project and they
found that successful open source participation, measured by a higher rank in the hierarchy of programmers in the project, translated into higher wages. The work in this paper contributes to the career concerns literature in a setting where open source software provides additional means through which programmers' talent may be conveyed to the labor market.
To summarize the above discussion, both the hiring firms and their employed programmers have economic incentives to work on open source projects. Firms value open source work due to the strategic value they may derive from these projects and the learning by doing benefits to their Dewan, Freimer, and Mehra: Firms to career incentives and the learning by doing effects which helps them to do a good job and hence get better compensation. However, the incentives of the firm and the programmers are not aligned. Consequently, the programmer may choose to devote effort/attention in the two projects that are not optimal from the firm's perspective. Since programming is a task that requires significant autonomy and creativity, the firm cannot easily monitor (Kirsch (1996) ) the effort/attention devoted by programmers to each of the projects. To the extent the firm cannot perfectly monitor the effort/attention division, this effort division results in lower net benefits for the firm and a moral hazard situation for programmers. In order to mitigate this problem, the firm may provide We find the marginal effect of effort to be a key determinant of contract choices offered by the firm. For high expected marginal revenues with respect to effort in the closed source project, the firm offers a contract that provides a bonus for good performance in the closed project only. For low levels of expected marginal revenues, the firm offers a contract that provides a bonus for good performance in the open project only. For moderate levels of expected marginal revenues, the firm does not offer any bonus for either project. If the programmers have alternate employment options additional compensation may be required to make the firm's employment as attractive as these alternate opportunities. In such cases, the firm may offer a contract that provides bonuses for both the open and closed projects. The contract in this situation is socially optimal since it maximizes the total value created by the programmer. Other contracts do not have this feature.
We find that the degree to which the proprietary project is open, i.e. the amount of information about individual contributions in proprietary projects that is revealed to the market may be an important factor influencing the total value created for the firm. An intermediate value of the degree of openness of the proprietary project is sometimes optimal. However, when alternate employment options are good requiring the firm to give bonuses for both the open and closed projects, the impact of this factor on firm value vanishes. The labor market for programmers consists of several firms. Each firm hires programmers to do programming projects at the beginning of each of an infinite succession of time periods. A programming project is an individual task that is assigned to a programmer and the programmer is solely responsible for creating the output to complete that task. Now we provide some details about both sides of this market: Firms and programmers.
2.1.1. Programmers A programmer may be either "talented" or "untalented". To simplify the information structure of the problem, we assume that success, or good outcome in a project is only possible if the programmer is talented. This is not an unreasonable assumption for the software industry; software industry experts have pointed out that the productivity of talented programmers is much higher than that of average programmers.
2
Further evidence comes from a 7 study in Goleman (1998) , where it was found that the top 1% of programmers were 1272% more efficient than the average. Thus it can be reasonably expected that in a given time period a talented programmer can achieve a better output compared to an average programmer.
The information on the talent of a programmer may/ may not be known and depends on how long the programmer has been in the programming industry. A programmer who has freshly entered the labor market after completing formal education is termed as a "rookie". While rookie programmers know their own capabilities, they are relatively unaware of industry requirements. Therefore, they are unable to ascertain how well their capabilities are suited for the requirements of the industry. In other words, their information set is insufficient to let them conclude whether they are talented or not with certainty. Similarly, while a hiring firm in the labor market is informed about the industry requirements, it has little information about the capabilities of an individual rookie programmer.
Thus the firm is also unable to conclude how well a particular individual is likely to perform. Due to these information asymmetries, we assume that neither the rookie programmers nor the labor market know whether a particular rookie is talented or not. We assume that there is a common prior probability m with which a rookie programmer may be talented. Analysis of a labor market with a similar description has been made earlier by Holmstrom (1999) where he studied how the incentives of workers to exert effort change along their career path. We further assume that a rookie programmer when employed can create a minimum value of g per period (i.e. both talented and untalented programmers create this value). Further, the market wage for rookies is normalized to zero.
As rookie programmers are employed and their contributions evaluated, the hiring firm, the programmers themselves, and other firms in the market find out talent of the programmers. The market wage for programmers who are known to be talented in the labor market is w t > 0. Thus, if the rookie programmers prove themselves to be talented, then their wage increases from zero to w t . This wage premium provides a career incentive to the rookies to convey their talent to the labor market.
Firms
A firm can get an expected value of w t by employing a talented programmer for one period 3 . However, if such a programmer is employed in low value projects, the value generated may be lower than w t . At the beginning of the game, the focus firm has a commercial closed project and a synergistic open source project with learning by doing benefits between the two projects. A successful outcome (meaning that the program provides all the user demanded functionality, does so without using too many computing resources, and is easy to maintain) in the open and closed projects creates a value g o and g c respectively. These values are over and above the minimum value g that is created by employing any programmer. We are interested in cases when g, g o and g c are not so large that the firm will directly hire a programmer with proven talent at the high market wage (w t ). We instead examine the case when these values are more moderate so that the firm will take a chance on hiring a rookie for its projects.
Revelation of Programmer Talent to the Market
The revelation of a rookie programmer's talent depends on two events: Success in open and closed projects and observation of this success by the market. Here we discuss the probabilities of both these events.
Probabilities of success in open and closed projects
The probabilities of the different outcomes of the two projects conditional on having a talented programmer are displayed in Table 1 . A highly successful outcome is classified as good and the other outcome as bad. Recall that previously we have assumed that the probability of success is zero in all projects for untalented programmers.
Good in Open Bad in Open Marginal Probability
All of these joint and marginal probabilities are functions of effort division, with fraction x of the effort being devoted to the closed source project and 1 − x of the effort to the open source project 4
. As discussed in the Introduction, we assume that this effort division is made by the programmer and is neither observable nor contractible by the firm in its employment contract with the programmer. The marginal probabilities (p c and p o ) are dependent on both the effort division x and learning by doing from the two projects. As the effort in a project increases, the positive impact of effort and learning by doing from this project on its marginal probability of success reduces due to diminishing returns. Further, increase in effort in this project implies reduction of effort in the other project.
Consequently, there is a negative impact on the marginal probability of success of this project due to reduction in learning by doing from the other project. Due to the diminishing returns phenomenon, this negative impact is increasing as the effort in the other project reduces. If this negative impact is strong enough, the slope of the marginal probability of success will eventually become negative. Clearly, this probability will be at its maximum at intermediate effort levels in such situations.
Similar to the above, for intermediate values of x, the probability of failure in both projects (p bb ) will be low because of better learning opportunities and balanced effort in both projects. At more extreme values of x, the imbalance in learning opportunities and effort division will cause an increase in this probability.
While both effort and learning by doing are inputs in determining the marginal probability values, we assume that the two projects are sufficiently differentiated and it is not the case that We do not consider such situations since firms are unlikely to risk hiring programmers to do both projects if this is the case. Given this focus, one would expect marginal probability of success in a project would reach a maximum at an effort division that favors that project.
Putting together the above we state the following assumption. Assumption 2. p gb (x) > 0 and p bg (x) < 0 for 0 < x < 1.
Difference in observability of outcomes of open and closed source projects:
Open and closed source projects differ in the information they make available to the labor market. Closed source, by its very nature, is much less revealing. Not only is the code not available for evaluation, the individual contribution is rarely made public. To focus on this difference between open and closed source projects we assume that the outcome of the open source project, success or failure, is observed publicly by all. In contrast, we assume that success in a closed source project is imperfectly and asymmetrically visible. While the hiring firm and the programmer always observe the outcome of the closed source project, the market gets to see the successful outcome of this project with probability p.
At this point, we define a useful class of probability functions as follows:
From Assumptions 1 and 2 it is easy to see that p r (z) is concave 5 and that p r (z) is maximized at
, since coefficients of z and 1 − z are both negative. Using p r (z), the probability that a talented rookie programmer is revealed to be so to the market is:
Consider the following example to illustrate all the probabilities discussed above:
Example 1. Let π(x) = ex (for 0 ≤ e ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1) be the probability of success in any one project if proportion x of time is spent on it and there is no learning value of one project for the other.
Suppose that a talented programmer spends effort x on the closed project and thereby spends leftover effort 1 − x on the open project. The joint probabilities of the various outcomes for a talented programmer taking into account the learning effect d are:
Note that d = 0 corresponds to the no learning case. Further, the probabilities make sense only when ≤ d ≤ 1. Thus, as explained earlier, the assumption put bounds on the extent of learning effects.
The marginal probabilities, p c and p o , and the probability of revelation of talent, p t , are illustrated in Figure 1 for d = 0.6, e = 0.5 and p = 0.5.
Surplus for Rookie Programmers and the Firm
Recall that we are considering situations where the firm initially hires a rookie programmer for a single period for doing open and closed source projects. The rookie may be rehired in future either by this firm or by other market firms based on her performance. In this section, we focus on getting the expressions for the total surpluses of the rookie and the firm. In writing these surpluses, we use δ as the discount rate per period. At this point, we introduce 
The rookie programmer's future employment opportunities are contingent on the outcomes in the first period since these outcomes may reveal whether the programmer is talented or not, publicly (information becomes available to programmer, first period hiring firm and all market firms), or privately (information becomes available to programmer and first period hiring firm while the market firms are excluded). The complete tree depicting the events and decisions is shown in Figure   2 . The events are noted at each branch and the probabilities of the events are noted in parenthesis.
The future surpluses earned by the programmer are noted at the culmination of a sequence of events. If a particular sequence of events is impossible (probability 0 event), then the surpluses for that sequence are omitted. The circle in the figure depicts a decision node; the programmer's decision at this point influences future surpluses.
If a rookie is untalented, she fails in producing a good outcome in both projects. Further, even if the rookie is talented, she fails in producing a good outcome in both projects with probability p bb .
Information Systems Research 00(0), pp. 000-000, c 2005 AUTHORS Thus a rookie who produced a bad outcome in both projects can only be talented with probability
. One can easily show that mp bb (1−m)+mp bb < m. Thus a fresh rookie has a greater probability of being talented than a rookie who failed in producing a good outcome in both projects. Further, the market wage of rookies is zero. Thus all firms will always prefer to employ fresh rookies over failed rookies. Due to this, the failed rookies will have no future earning potential. Accordingly, the lowest two branches in the event tree in Figure 2 show future earnings of 0.
If the rookie programmer is talented, has succeeded in one or more projects and her success is revealed to the labor market, then she can find employment in all subsequent periods with a wage of w t in each period. Thus the present value of the surplus is δw t + δ An interesting situation arises when a talented programmer succeeds only in the closed project, and this information does not become public. Will the market firms be interested in hiring such a programmer? Note that the market firms cannot distinguish between these programmers and those who genuinely failed in producing a good outcome in both projects. Thus if the market firms pick a programmer from this pool, the probability that this programmer is talented is
It is easy to show that
Thus the market firms can get talented programmers from the fresh rookie pool with a higher probability at zero wages. Therefore these firms will never give an offer to such failed programmers. In other words, the outside opportunities for these programmers are zero in this period. As a result these programmers will take an offer from the first period hiring firm even at zero wages. Note that failure to publicly show a successful output results in a penalty since such programmers are reemployed at zero wages while their peers who could publicly show a successful output are reemployed at w t . However, this is not a permanent problem since the act of rehiring by the first period firm in the subsequent period informs the rest of the market firms that such a programmer was indeed talented. Therefore, the programmer is recognized as a talented programmer after a lag of one period and she then starts to earn the wage w t per period implying that the present value of future earnings are 0 + δ
According to the above discussion, the programmer's expected surplus from the current and all future periods is:
Examining Equation 2 we note that the market wage w t for talented programmers sets up an incentive for the programmers to make effort choices in the current period to increase the chance of revealing her talent in future. This career concern is similar to that in Holmstrom (1999).
Firm surplus
The expected value of the first period projects to the firm for which it hires rookies is g + mp c g c + mp o g o . This is not the only value created for the firm when it rehires programmers in subsequent periods. With probability m(1 − p)p gb the firm will be in a situation where it knows that its current employee is talented but the labor market does not. As pointed out in the last section, this allows the firm to re-hire such programmers at zero wages for the subsequent period. In order to induce these programmers to work and avoid shirking, the firm must give a bonus > 0 that is contingent on a successful outcome in this period. Even if is made arbitrarily small, the programmers maximize their surplus by maximizing the chances of producing a successful outcome. Thus shirking can be avoided at negligible cost. Consequently, the firm gets an expected rent of m(1 − p)p gb w t in the next period. Putting these terms together and considering the wage paid to the programmer, we get the total expected surplus, in net present value, for the firm by hiring a rookie programmer to be:
Assuming that m > 0, we drop it from expressions of ES, EW and EV in the following discussion as it multiplies all the terms in these expressions except for g in EV . We scale g appropriately.
Analysis
The firm wants to maximize its surplus in the contract it signs with a rookie programmer. Therefore, the firm's problem is:
The Individual Rationality constraint, in Expression 5, expresses the requirement that the programmer get a minimum utility u from employment with the firm. Note that with the career concerns this is not just a constraint on wages and bonuses but also the value from future prospects.
The Incentive Compatibility constraint in Equation 4 results from the assumption that given the terms of the employment contract, the programmer picks the effort division that maximizes her personal expected surplus. Replacing 4 by its first order condition, we have:
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In the Appendix we state and prove three lemmas that characterize the problem. In Lemma 1 we show that the effort division x * chosen by the programmer to maximize her own surplus lies between
x o and x c . Thus x * has an internal value and the first order condition makes sense. If an extremely large bonus is offered for the closed project then the programmer will effectively maximize p c which occurs at x c . Correspondingly, if the firm offers an extremely large bonus for the open project, the worker will maximize p o , which occurs at x o . When no bonuses are given, Equation 6 will be satisfied when (p t + (1 − p)p gb δ) = 0 implying that the effort choice is such that the expression
. By doing this the programmer maximizes the expected payoffs due to revelation of talent which is the only payoff in absence of any incentives through bonuses. The optimal effort division for the firm depends upon the values of project successes, g c and g o . Thus the effort division chosen by the programmer in absence of bonuses and the one that is optimal for the firm may be quite different. The firm then provides bonuses to mitigate this discrepancy.
For the effort divisions that satisfy the incentive compatibility condition, i.e., for x o < x < x c , we note that p o is decreasing and p c is increasing in x. As a result, increasing w c increases the effort in the closed project while increasing w o decreases effort in the closed project. This is proven in Lemma 2.
As a last observation we note in Lemma 3 that when the Individual Rationality constraint is not binding then the firm will not offer a positive bonus for both the open and the closed source projects simultaneously in a particular contract. The intuition for this result follows from the fact that w c and w o have opposite effects on the effort division chosen by the programmer and having them both positive adds to the expected wage but has no benefit in aligning the incentives of the programmer and the firm.
In order to characterize the optimal bonus choices by the firm, we define M R as the marginal revenue for the firm as a function of x.
Proposition 1 lays down the optimal choice of bonuses in terms of the marginal value calculated at the effort division chosen by the programmer when the Individual Rationality constraint is trivially satisfied, for example when u = 0. 
Proposition 1. If the Individual Rationality constraint (IR) is not binding, then the choice of bonuses that locally maximize the firm's value is reflected in the following menu:
where
and the starred terms indicate that the corresponding quantity is evaluated at x * , the optimal effort division chosen by the programmer.
The proof of Proposition 1 is presented in the Appendix. Since the cases depicted in this proposition represent local maximums, it may be possible for more than one case to be simultaneously satisfied. In such situations, the firm will pick the solution that provides the maximum EV , i.e. the one that is globally optimal. The main points conveyed through Proposition 1 are that the firm will either pay no bonuses or pay a bonus for only one of the projects. We next want to explore how the bonuses are changed when the programmer has a minimum utility that must be met for her to stay employed, i.e., if the Individual Rationality constraint applies. In particular, our interest is to establish the contract characteristics when the firm pays bonuses for both projects simultaneously. Intuitively, this will happen when paying a bonus for only one project to meet the IR constraint distorts the programmer's choice of effort division too far away from the firm's optimal choice. Our next result describes this type of solution. 
The proof is presented in the Appendix. Proposition 2 establishes that the solution with bonuses for both projects is also socially optimal since this maximizes the total value created for the firm and the programmer. We refer to this total value as EV t where
This is surprising since one might think that offering both types of bonuses must be inefficient as they have opposite effects on the choice of effort division (Lemma 2). 
III. The solution specified in Proposition 2 iff
As in Proposition 1, the cases in Proposition 3 too represent local solutions and in case of multiple solutions being possible, the firm will pick the one that is globally optimal. A comparison of the to 25 and g c is reduced to 5 while others are held fixed. This is useful to showcase that in Figure   5 cases (II) and (III) of Proposition 3 and in Figure 6 cases (I) and (III) of Proposition 3 apply.
We now comment on the social efficiency of the various solutions in Propositions 1 and 3. The point x 2 in the figure corresponds to the effort division that maximizes social efficiency. Proposition 2 establishes that this is the effort division that is picked by the programmer when w * c > 0, w * o > 0 and the IR constraint is binding. In Lemma 5, presented in the Appendix, we show that dEV t /dx > 0 when w * c > 0, w * o = 0 and the IR constraint is not binding. Hence, in this case the bonuses offered by the firm induce the programmer to pick an effort division that is too small for social efficiency. This is illustrated in Figure 7 by point x 1 . When the IR constraint binds, but w * c > 0 and w * o = 0, the bonus for the closed project must be raised to meet the IR constraint. Hence, in accordance Dewan, Freimer, and with Lemma 2, the equilibrium effort level increases. This reduces the discrepancy from the socially optimal effort level, at least initially. If the IR constraint is not binding and w * o > 0 and w * c = 0, then, as shown in Lemma 6 in the Appendix, the effort choice in equilibrium is too high for social efficiency (dEV t /dx < 0). This is illustrated in Figure 7 by point x 3 . As before, when the IR constraint binds, the bonus for the open project may be increased and this may reduce the Dewan, Freimer, and 
Figure 7
Social efficiency discrepancy from the socially optimum effort.
Impact of Degree of Openness of the Proprietary Project
The open source project is superior to the closed source project for the programmer in that it more clearly reveals the talent of the programmer. In absence of any direct incentives offered by the firm, this built in career incentive dictates the effort division of the programmer between the open and closed source projects. In the preceding analysis we showed that such effort division may not be optimal for the firm and it may give bonuses to induce a different effort division.
Another way in which the firm could possibly induce a favorable effort division is by changing the degree of openness of the proprietary project. As the proprietary project is made more open, success in this project is more likely to convey to the labor market that the programmer is talented.
Thus the programmer will pick an effort division that is more in favor of the proprietary project.
Increasing the degree of openness of the proprietary project however comes at a cost to the firm because this reduces the chances that the firm will have private information that the programmer is talented. Hence the benefits from employing a talented programmer at a low wage cost would If the IR constraint is binding, the optimal decision for the firm changes since it now needs to ensure a minimum payoff to the programmer. If it is paying a bonus in only one project to ascertain the minimum payoff, the flexibility of adjusting the degree of openness may allow the firm to do this at a lower cost and may therefore improve the firm's value. If, however, the firm is paying bonuses on both projects, it picks the bonuses to implement an effort that maximizes the total surplus EV t . The firm value EV = EV t − u, therefore, remains unchanged even if the degree of openness of the closed project can be adjusted. This happens because as the degree of openness of the closed project increases, the programmer gets additional future benefits due to increase in chances of revelation of talent. Consequently, the firm implements the socially optimal effort by lowering bonus payments. However, the savings in cost from bonus payments are exactly compensated for by the increase in cost to the firm due to increase in p. Hence the net cost to the firm and the firm value remain the same.
Concluding Remarks

Discussion on Model Assumptions and Limitations
An artifact of our model is the assumption that only talented programmers can produce a successful outcome which can then be construed as an informational signal of talent. If even untalented programmers can sometimes create a successful outcome, the major impact on our model will be Information Systems Research 00(0), pp. 000-000, c 2005 AUTHORS that output created by rookies in the first period of employment will not be sufficient to conclude whether they are talented. Now information on the output created over several periods will be needed to make a judgment of the programmers' talent. Hence the premium for being a talented programmer, reflected in the market wage w t , will be available only after several periods. Clearly, the future payoffs to signaling talent are reduced. The choice of effort division is made by the programmers' to maximize their combined payoff from the future payoffs and the expected bonus payment in the current period. Since the future becomes less valuable with the relaxing of this assumption, the firm may be able to influence the programmers' choice of effort division by paying a lower bonus and therefore results in a lower expected surplus for the programmers. However, this makes the IR constraint bind more quickly. The firm must then raise the bonus to meet the IR constraint until paying a bonus for just one project to meet the IR constraint results in a highly distorted effort division by the programmer. The firm will then have to resort to paying bonuses for both projects, just as in the current model. Thus our key insights are expected to be robust to relaxing this assumption.
A limitation is that we have only focused on learning by doing and not on learning through In particular, no bonus payments are necessary to induce programmers to learn through training as the firm can explicitly control programmers' participation in these activities.
Assumptions 1 and 2 are central to our model and capture the impact of effort and learning by doing effects. Due to the tension in the effort and learning by doing, the marginal probabilities of success are assumed to be concave with internal maxima. If, however, the learning by doing effects are not strong enough, the concavity of the marginal probabilities and the internal maxima will disappear and our results will not apply. As an outcome of this assumption, the probabilities p r (z) also turn out to be concave. Assumption 2 makes the point that the impact of learning by doing is not too large. Relaxing these assumptions may induce a programmer to choose effort x * = 0, or x * = 1. Since we are not interested in corner solutions, our assumptions help eliminate these uninteresting situations and allow us to focus on situations where the learning effects are significant but at the same time they are not too large so as to have an overriding influence.
Discussion of the Setting and Results
It has been observed that many programmers hired by software development firms contribute to open source software projects in addition to working at the projects for which they have been in the open project than the firm). Due to this situation, the firm may enter into performance based contracts with programmers to align their incentives with its own. We find that when the marginal revenue of effort for the closed project is high, the firm pays a bonus for this project.
When this marginal revenue is low, the firm pays a bonus for the open project. For the mid-range of marginal value the firm pays no bonuses. The programmers' then make an effort choice that maximizes the chance of exposing her talent in the labor market to get the wage premium for talented programmers in future. If however, the outside opportunities are attractive, future benefits may not be sufficient to attract the programmers to take the firm's job offer. In this case, the firm may pay a bonus for both projects. We further note that a socially efficient outcome is obtained in circumstances when the firm offers bonuses for both the projects. This is because with the bonuses chosen by the firm, the programmer picks an effort division that maximizes the total expected value created.
If the firm employs policies that showcase the programmers' contributions in the proprietary project in a much better way to the other market firms, the programmers will have a higher incentive to invest effort in this project. Thus making the proprietary project more open can serve as a substitute to increasing the bonus for this project. However, such a policy comes at a cost to the firm since it reduces the chances of the firm having access to the services of a talented programmer at low wage costs. The strategy employed by Firaxis Games is similar to the one we discuss here. This firm owns the rights to a very famous game named Civilization. It lists the names of important developers of this game on its web site. Adobe Inc. also employs a similar policy. When the Adobe Photoshop CS2 version 9.0 loads, the names of the important contributors are listed. This kind of policy is likely to be effective only when the outside market opportunities are not too attractive. When this is not the case, increasing the degree of openness for the closed project is unlikely to yield any benefit.
In summary then, this paper analyzes a new business model based on the now well understood 
